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District Heating in the UK: Prospects for a 
Third National Programme
David J C Hawkey
The UK has seen periodic attempts to develop large district heating (DH) networks 
to make use of residual heat from industry and power generation. Under concerns 
about climate change and energy security, DH has recently re-emerged in policy 
visions for future heat systems with small decentralised combined heat and power 
(CHP) generators playing a key role in the establishment of such networks. This 
paper draws on Stewart Russell’s accounts of earlier DH programmes, asking to what 
extent the reasons he concluded CHP and DH were systematically excluded continue 
to marginalise the technologies. In spite of governance changes which ostensibly 
open new opportunities for experimentation, key structural issues challenge the 
development of decentralised energy, particularly the alignment of the electricity 
sector to a centralised system and the dependency of local governments with limited 
capacity on central government. The reluctance of central government to engage in 
system planning and the failure to integrate policies related to energy production and 
energy consumption limit the eff ectiveness of support for DH. 
Keywords: district heating, combined heat and power, energy policy
Introduction
On page 78 of its 2013 policy paper, Th e 
Future of Heating: Meeting the challenge, 
the UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) illustrates its 
strategic framework for low carbon heat 
in buildings in a fi gure showing a “pincer 
movement” involving diff erent energy 
networks. New district heating (DH) 
networks would be established in dense 
urban areas, in time expanding outwards 
to lower density suburbs. Electricity 
networks would be upgraded to support 
building-scale electric heat pumps in rural 
areas, with reinforcement progressively 
extending to higher density areas. Th e 
currently ubiquitous gas network (which 
serves around 80% of building heat 
demand) would eventually be scaled back 
dramatically (DECC, 2013).
Th e fi gure, as a summary of the 
Government’s proposed strategy, is 
remarkable for a number of reasons. 
First, the scale of the change envisaged is 
unprecedented: while there are countries 
where district heating and/or electric 
heating are ubiquitous (particularly in 
Scandinavia) there is no precedent for a 
transition away from widespread network 
gas heating (International Energy Agency, 
2009). Second, the “pincer movement” 
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is presented as a shift in thinking about 
heating, away from an emphasis on the 
technologies connected to networks, to 
consideration of system wide confi gurations 
of network infrastructure. Th ird, the 
strategy is clear that decisions between 
heating technologies and infrastructure 
will be driven by informed consumers, 
and not by government-led planning (of 
the sort which underpinned development 
of most widespread energy distribution 
networks in the past) (Graham & Marvin, 
2001; Grohnheit & Gram Mortensen, 2003). 
And fourthly, because the UK Government 
has twice before tried to establish major 
programmes of district heating, neither of 
which succeeded.
Th e Ministerial foreword to DECC’s Heat 
Strategy states, “We have […] inherited a 
big hole where there should be policy for 
fi nding alternatives to fossil fuel for the 
supply of heat,” (DECC, 2013: 1). To the 
extent that this “big hole” relates to district 
heating, Stewart Russell’s pioneering work 
on the social shaping of technology (Russell, 
1993, 1994, 1996), which sought to explain 
the neglect of combined heat and power 
(CHP) and district heating (DH), provides a 
valuable basis on which to understand the 
roots of this inheritance. Russell’s account 
rejected the notion that technological 
development and deployment were driven 
by an internal logic of improvement, and 
sought instead to reveal “the complex 
interaction of economic, political and 
social forces that shape development and 
adoption of technologies in particular 
forms” (Russell, 1993: 50). 
Russell argued that the neglect of CHP/
DH in spite of attempts to introduce it 
was systematic (in the sense of being 
characteristic of a social formation) rather 
than accidental (in the sense that a diff erent 
outcome could have been realised without 
signifi cant changes to the energy sector 
or wider society). Th is paper examines the 
prospects for DH to become more widely 
used in the UK as envisaged in DECC’s 
(2013) heat strategy, drawing on Russell’s 
historical analysis to ask to what extent 
the forces he identifi ed as systematically 
marginalising CHP and DH have parallels 
today, and whether emerging policy 
approaches address these issues in an 
eff ective way. 
Th e paper is organised as follows. Th e 
next section introduces the concepts used 
in the paper, drawing out central social 
shaping of technology themes in Russell’s 
writing on CHP/DH in the UK. Th is section 
frames the later discussion by drawing on 
energy policy and governance literatures 
to present some of the contemporary 
contextual aspects of the UK relevant to 
the investigation. After that I describe 
the empirical material used in the two 
sections that follow, which explore issues 
confronting the development of DH 
networks and CHP systems providing heat 
to them respectively. Th e fi nal section 
concludes.
DH, CHP and the Political 
Economy of the UK
History of CHP and DH Programmes
Although experiments with CHP and DH 
can be traced back to the late 19th Century, 
the fi rst signifi cant attempt at a national 
DH programme in the UK followed the 
Second World War. Central government 
initially saw signifi cant opportunities 
for rationalising energy use in a context 
of limited supply by coordinating the 
newly nationalised energy industries with 
the reconstruction and regeneration of 
British cities. However, the organisational 
challenges implied by widespread district 
heating, resistance within the nationalised 
electricity supply industry to operate (or 
accept electricity from) CHP, restrictions on 
the powers of local authorities and resource 
Science & Technology Studies 3/2014
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shortages aff ecting the housing programme 
contributed to the failure of these plans 
(Russell, 1993, 1994, 1996).
National visions of widespread city-
scale DH systems were revived in the 
second attempted major programme, the 
“Lead Cities” programme, which arose in 
the context of concerns around resource 
availability prompted by the 1970s oil crises. 
Th e programme was caught up in, and 
ultimately fell victim to, widespread changes 
in government policy which eventually led 
to the liberalisation and privatisation of 
most nationalised industries, including the 
energy industries. In this context, DH and 
CHP were seen as something of a test case 
for the new approach, with Government 
scaling back its proposed investment in 
favour of private capital. Th e shrinking 
number of cities included in the programme 
found they were unable to make schemes 
attractive to private investors who sought 
higher and shorter-term returns, and whose 
perceptions of investment risk were likely 
heightened by the Government’s apparently 
waning commitment (Russell, 1993, 1994, 
1996). 
Stewart Russell’s historical analysis of DH 
programmes was inherently sociotechnical, 
emphasising that the development of 
technology and social arrangements are 
part of the same process (Russell & Williams, 
2002b). Key STS features of Russell’s 
account include alignment of interests 
around a centralised electricity system 
supported by co-production of that system 
and its social organisation, the distributed 
nature of change that widespread use of 
CHP and DH would imply, and a balance 
between the apparently idiosyncratic issues 
that held back particular schemes and the 
systemic issues which kept the technologies 
in a precarious and marginal position (c.f. 
Russell & Williams, 2002b). 
Th e twin products of CHP, heat and 
power, underpin the division which runs 
through Russell’s account between the 
integration of the technology with the 
electricity system, and the development 
of DH infrastructure. Issues in the former 
domain focused on the centralised 
character of the electricity system, both in its 
organisational form as a national-scale state 
owned company and the corresponding 
technical confi guration the industry 
pursued with large centralised stations 
and electricity cascading down through 
transmission networks to distribution 
networks to consumers. Incompatibilities 
between this centralised sociotechnical 
system and the use of CHP as a smaller 
scale electricity generating technology 
embedded in distribution networks, both 
in terms of a capital investment programme 
and in relation to network control, led 
to the marginalisation of the technology 
from the electricity supply industry under 
both programmes. Th is marginalisation 
took the form both of decisions within the 
nationalised industry not to develop its 
own CHP systems, and of an unsupportive 
(and at times actively hostile) response of 
the industry to other organisations feeding 
CHP electricity into the public system.
Th e latter domain, the development 
of DH infrastructure networks, was also 
frustrated by capacities and interests 
infl uenced by organisational structures and 
relationships. While some organisations 
(such as universities) developed heat 
networks to serve a small number of 
buildings, local authorities, in the main, 
were the central actors in plans for larger 
scale, multi-organisation heat networks 
(Russell, 1993). UK local authorities are 
limited by the ultra vires principle which 
prevents them from engaging in activities 
not expressly sanctioned from the centre 
(Wilson & Game, 2002). In the post-war 
period, no general dispensation for local 
government to develop or operate DH 
networks existed. When the UK parliament 
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granted individual local authorities powers, 
they were often restricted to fragmented 
areas of their city. By the second CHP/DH 
programme local authorities had general 
powers to develop heat networks, but their 
capacity to shape the spatial relationships 
between sources of, and demand for, 
heat was limited by constraints on their 
spatial planning powers. Dependence on 
central government was manifest during 
the second period in the arrangements 
for fi nancing DH systems: initially central 
government support was planned, but this 
was withdrawn in favour of private capital 
which proved diffi  cult to mobilise at a cost 
which systems could cover (Russell, 1996).
Russell (1993: 48) argued that the split 
between organisations involved in heat and 
power refl ected not only the twin products 
of CHP, but also a characteristic split in 
energy debates in the UK between interests 
organised around energy production 
(viz. the electricity industry) and interests 
organised around consumption (as 
mediated or expressed by local authorities 
seeking to achieve social goals through 
development of heat networks). Contrasting 
the UK with other Western European 
countries where extensive DH systems 
have developed is instructive. During DH 
development, these countries had relatively 
autonomous local government, often able to 
coordinate heat network development with 
municipally operated electricity systems, 
other local infrastructure, and development 
of the built environment, particularly 
housing (Ericson, 2009; Grohnheit & Gram 
Mortensen, 2003; Raven & Verbong, 2007; 
Rutherford, 2008; Summerton, 1992).
In Russell’s account, the dependence 
of DH/CHP development on UK central 
government can be seen in the eff ects of its 
withdrawal from an active role in planning 
at the times of both programmes. While 
nationalisation of the energy industries 
was justifi ed in terms of rationalising a 
dysfunctional sector, the UK government’s 
plan for CHP and DH was not embedded 
in a strategic vision of the confi guration, 
components or integration of the energy 
industries. When the electricity industry 
sought to establish its autonomy from 
central government control (indeed using 
CHP as a test case for this relationship), 
central government acquiesced, choosing 
rather to use the nationalised industries 
only expediently as a component of its 
Keynesian management of the economy 
(Russell, 1996). Th e explicit goal of freeing 
the energy industries from political control 
through privatisation contributed to the 
destabilisation and failure of the second 
programme.
Complementing these structural 
issues, Russell also described some of 
the mechanisms by which organisational 
interests were expressed and translated into 
action, or more commonly inaction. While 
a wide range of social issues motivated 
interest in CHP and DH (raising standards 
of living, cheap warmth for low income 
households, effi  cient use of resources, 
regeneration of local industry, local 
employment and regeneration of housing 
stock), terms of appraisal imposed on CHP/
DH schemes were progressively narrowed 
to cost benefi t analyses and ultimately 
(in the run-up to privatisation) whether 
schemes could off er returns attractive to 
private investors (Russell, 1993). Russell 
argued that the ‘technical’ character of 
debate this led to did not undermine his 
analysis of organisational interests. Indeed, 
the fact that a variety of diff erent methods 
and criteria for appraising CHP/DH were 
deployed in these debates supports the 
view that judgements whether the option 
was ‘economic’ or not could not be reduced 
to some internal technical characteristics. 
Instead, Russell argued, appraisal refl ected 
the priorities of, and constraints on, the 
performing institution. For example, the 
David J. C. Hawkey
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caught up in the 1979 government’s moves 
to redefi ne the boundaries of the state, 
with liberalisation and privatisation of 
energy an iconic example of a widespread 
shift in governance arrangements to the 
use of competitive markets (and, where 
such markets were not feasible, market-
mimicking mechanisms) with the aim of 
driving up economic effi  ciency through 
lower costs and stimulation of innovation 
(Fudge et al., 2011; Helm, 2005). 
Th e character of energy policy (and 
the corresponding industry structure) 
in these periods was refl ective of what 
Russell and Williams (2002a) identifi ed 
as more widespread developments 
in technology policy, from nationally 
organised infrastructure, industrial and 
military programmes up to the 1970s, to 
policies inaugurated in the 1980s designed 
to create supportive conditions for a 
wider range of actors to innovate. Russell 
and Williams (2002a) detected a further 
shift in technology policy from the end 
of the 1990s towards an approach which 
maintains an orientation to distributed 
processes (indeed national governments 
have largely retreated from planning), while 
accommodating a more complex view of 
the development of technologies and a 
corresponding broadening of the sites for 
policy intervention.
In UK energy policy, the extent of such 
a shift is the subject of academic debate. 
Helm (2005) argues that contrary to 
political expectation, liberalisation did not 
result in de-regulation of energy, and that 
the enduring role of government in setting 
the framework for the (increased range of) 
actors in the energy system has become 
more pressing through mounting energy 
security and environmental problems. 
Th ese pressures became so acute at the end 
of the 1990s that government was led to 
explore a wider range of policy interventions 
to purposively reshape UK energy systems 
nationalised electricity company concluded 
that in only in a limited number of cases 
would DH be ‘practicable and economic’, 
ignoring its own role in weakening the 
fi nancial case for DH by off ering poor terms 
and low prices for electricity from CHP. 
Th e failure to consider CHP as an integral 
part of the UK’s energy systems, instead 
holding it as an adjunct to a centralised 
system, meant schemes struggled to fi nd 
a viable position in a system not designed 
for them. Th e marginal performance of the 
fragmented schemes which struggled to 
exist in this context itself became part of the 
marginalisation of the option, negatively 
shaping visions and understandings of 
what CHP and DH would mean in the UK, 
visions which were weakly articulated and 
not widely shared in the fi rst place (Russell, 
1993; Weber, 2003). 
Th is presentation does not exhaust the 
themes and detail of Russell’s account (for 
example, the association of CHP and DH 
with a range of issues and support from 
unusual political coalitions). However, it is 
these themes — the shaping of interests and 
capacities through organisational structures 
and relationships, and mechanisms by 
which those interests are expressed — that 
I focus on in exploring the contemporary 
prospects for CHP and DH.
Contemporary UK Energy Policy and 
Politics
While Russell’s account revealed striking 
parallels between the failure of both the 
CHP/DH programmes of the 1940s/50s 
and the 1970s/80s, they failed at diff erent 
times and under diff erent conditions. 
In the post-war period, industry and 
government coalesced around a 
model of centralised command-and-
control decision making oriented to 
rational infrastructure development as 
a component of economic expansion 
(Helm, 2005). Th e second programme was 
73
(Helm, 2004, 2005). Others disagree with 
the contention that this represents a 
new ‘paradigm’ in energy policy, arguing 
that signifi cant continuities with the 
1990s exist in commitments to market 
and market-mimicking approaches to 
resource allocation (including investment 
decisions), technology neutrality of policy, 
independence of regulation and linking 
of growth-based indicators of prosperity 
with analyses of energy economics 
(Fudge et al., 2011; Mitchell, 2008). Th ese 
authors argue these continuities render 
policy interventions ineff ective, and 
marginalise visions of an energy system 
radically diff erent to the current fossil fuel-
dependent centralised system.
Shifts (to whatever extent) in energy 
policy are embedded in broader political 
and policy programmes and assumptions. 
Moran (2003) argues that the form in 
which the energy sector was reconfi gured 
in the 1990s is part of a more general 
transition in UK governance (covering 
sectors as diverse as fi nancial services, 
medicine and sport), from systems of ‘club 
government’ to systems of enforced self-
regulation which Mitchell (2008) groups 
under the Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP). 
Where club government was oriented to 
closed networks, personal contacts, tacit 
understandings and autonomy of sectors 
from state oversight, its replacement, 
the RSP, is characterised by codifi ed, 
juridifi ed and institutionalised systems 
of regulation. An important aspect of 
RSP governance is an emphasis on the 
autonomy of multiple actors’ decision 
making in regulated areas, on grounds that 
distributed actors have better access to 
information than a central actor. However, 
this emphasis sits uneasily with the state’s 
on-going modernist ambitions, such as 
to radically reduce territorial greenhouse 
gas emissions. In combination, these 
features of the RSP imply complex policies 
and programmes which aim to shape 
distributed actors’ decisions (for example, 
by altering relative prices). Th e demands 
of calibration and monitoring of these 
interventions has led central government 
to seek more information in pursuit of 
what Moran (2003) calls synoptic legibility. 
Th e relationship between local and central 
government has undergone changes in line 
with these broader developments, seeing an 
increase in the use of indicators and audit 
of performance alongside moves towards 
greater freedom of action from central 
control (Martin, 2011; Nutley et al., 2012). 
Details of how these broad shifts in 
governance in the UK are manifest in the 
domains of local government and energy 
are examined in later sections of the paper. 
However, this high level view of governance 
changes in the UK sets the context for the 
investigation: to what extent do attempts by 
central government to distribute decision 
making in energy and local government 
across other actors support or impede the 
contemporary development of CHP and 
DH?
CHP, DH and Low Carbon Energy
DH networks are ‘source agnostic’ and 
heat from CHP can be used in a variety 
of applications, so a coupling between 
CHP and DH is not inevitable. Indeed, the 
development of DH networks in Sweden 
included very little CHP, and much of the 
CHP developed in the Netherlands in the 
1990s did not feed DH networks (Ericson, 
2009; Hekkert et al., 2007). In the UK, DH 
development commonly draws on gas-
fi red megawatt-scale CHP. Gas CHP off ers 
desirable characteristics to DH developers 
and operators: as a mature technology with 
well established fuel supply, heat source 
risks are reduced. In addition, electricity 
prices in the UK are largely determined by 
gas prices and the main competitor for heat 
supply is gas, meaning changes in input and 
David J. C. Hawkey
Science & Technology Studies 3/2014
74
output prices for gas CHP move together, 
giving the technology a ‘natural hedge’. Th e 
proportion of homes with central heating 
has increased steadily from less than a third 
in 1970 to over 95% (Palmer & Cooper, 2011). 
Fuel poverty measurement varies between 
parts of the UK, but in broad terms was at 
a low point of around 5% of households in 
2004 and has consistently risen to around 
15% in 2011 (Hills, 2012). CHP and DH can 
make heating more aff ordable particularly 
when replacing electric heating, making 
retrofi t of CHP/DH to alleviate fuel poverty 
in electrically heated high-rise dwellings a 
particular target for the technology (DECC, 
2013). 
Th e link between DH and CHP in what 
follows is, therefore, justifi ed by this link 
existing in contemporary practice, though 
over the longer term this relationship may 
evolve into something diff erent. While 
(unabated) fossil-fuelled CHP can achieve 
short-term greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions, it nonetheless produces 
CO2, and may in future be more carbon 
intensive than alternative forms of heat 
and power generation, such as renewable 
electricity and electric heat pumps (DECC, 
2013). Th e role of CHP and DH in possible 
trajectories of decarbonisation of energy 
systems is, however, complicated by the 
possible dynamics of future energy systems 
including the role of CHP in effi  cient 
balancing of an electricity system with 
infl exible generation such as nuclear and 
renewables (Lehtonen & Nye, 2009; Toke 
& Fragaki, 2008) and the use of CHP as 
a bridge to lower carbon heat sources 
(DECC, 2013; Rotheray, 2011). Large 
scale DH networks could have a variety of 
relationships with other energy systems 
depending on future outcomes (in patterns 
of generation and resource availability) that 
are currently highly uncertain. Considering 
these relationships is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but is noted as one source of 
uncertainty and complexity confronting 
development of DH and CHP in the UK.
Data Sources
Th is paper draws on the fi rst three years 
of a four year research project into the 
prospects for sustainable heat in cities, 
Heat and the City (www.heatandthecity.
org.uk). Th e project explores the prospects 
for development of sustainable heat in UK 
cities and has gathered a range of original 
empirical material through surveys, 
interviews, workshops and observation at 
meetings. Th is dataset concerns household 
experiences with DH, the organisation, 
development and fi nancing of local DH 
initiatives, and policy making at local 
authority, Scottish Government and UK 
Government levels. In this paper I draw 
on a subset of this empirical material as it 
relates to the development of heat network 
infrastructure (next section) and the 
relationship between CHP and DH with 
the incumbent energy system (subsequent 
section). Original data is combined with 
analysis of policy documents, practitioner 
guides and research reports, and relevant 
academic literature as indicated in the text. 
Th e material used in the section on 
the development of DH networks focuses 
primarily on the role of local government. 
Th e perspectives of local authority offi  cers 
on the challenges of developing heat 
networks are drawn from 49 interviews with 
offi  cers across 5 city case studies, along 
with a series of 4 workshops, organised as 
part of Heat and the City, with members 
of a network of 65 local authorities and 12 
housing associations actively engaged in 
developing district energy initiatives. Th is 
material is combined with observations 
from academic literature on local 
government and documentary analysis of 
UK policies concerning the powers of local 
authorities and support for DH, to situate 
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the reported immediate concerns of these 
individuals in a broader context of local 
governance.
Th e exploration, in the subsequent 
section, of the integration of CHP/DH 
with the incumbent energy system is 
guided by challenges reported by project 
developers, consultants and industry, 
and draws parallels between these and 
issues Russell highlighted in his historical 
account. Th is material is combined with 
interview data and engagement at meetings 
and workshops with government energy 
policy makers. Again, rather than take the 
perspective of these individuals as objective 
sources of information, this primary data is 
supplemented by analysis of the evolution 
of UK energy policy through documentary 
analysis and relevant issues identifi ed in the 
literature on UK energy governance.
Contemporary Development 
of Heat Networks in the UK
Local government has historically played 
a central role in attempts to develop DH 
networks, both in the UK and elsewhere 
(Russell, 1993; Ericson, 2009; Grohnheit & 
Gram Mortensen, 2003). Th e breadth of its 
estate (including housing development) 
means it can anchor local heat networks, its 
role in spatial planning and building control 
enables it (in principle) to strategically 
coordinate infrastructure development, 
it is able to broker relationships between 
organisations with local presence, and its 
potential to make long term investment 
is underpinned by its commitment to the 
locality, low borrowing costs and its role 
in securing local social objectives. While 
other organisations can (and do) develop 
heat networks (particularly campus-based 
organisations such as universities and 
hospital complexes, or social landlords), 
local government nonetheless is looked to 
by both policy-makers and practitioners 
in the UK as playing a crucial role in the 
possibility for city-wide DH systems able 
to achieve greater economies of scale 
(International Energy Agency, 2005).
Fragmented Local Governance
Recent UK reforms to relationships between 
central (and devolved) government and 
local government ostensibly empower local 
authorities to act innovatively (Martin, 
2011). Th e ultra vires principal has been 
relaxed somewhat by new powers of 
“wellbeing” (introduced in 2000) which 
allow local authorities to undertake 
activities judged to improve the social, 
economic or environmental wellbeing 
of their areas. Th e fi nancial liability 
local authorities can incur is no longer 
capped by central government. Instead 
borrowing is regulated by a set of rules 
(the Prudential Code) administered by an 
independent professional institute (the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy). 
However, limited capacities of local 
government to develop DH networks, and 
the dependence of local authorities on 
support from central government remain 
striking features of UK DH development. 
While borrowing powers have been 
extended, fi nancial autonomy from central 
government is limited in comparison with 
other European countries, with a relatively 
low proportion of local government funding 
coming from local taxes and fees (Wilson 
& Game, 2002). Th e introduction of the 
wellbeing powers was accompanied by 
new forms of performance management 
structured around performance indicators 
and ring-fencing of central government 
grants to specifi c local activities, which 
led many local government departments 
to be more responsive to their central 
government equivalent than their local 
counterparts (Leach & Percy-Smith, 2001; 
Wilson & Game, 2002).
David J. C. Hawkey
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A parallel trend in local governance in 
the UK has been the fragmentation of local 
service delivery. In pursuit of performance 
improvement through competition, various 
powers and responsibilities have been 
transferred from local government to other 
providers. For example, the 1988 Housing 
Act removed local government’s monopoly 
on state-subsidised social housing, 
allowing numerous Housing Associations 
to compete for this function, limiting local 
government’s capacity to coordinate social 
housing development (Wilson & Game, 
2002). In addition local authorities, under 
obligations to secure “best value”, have been 
increasingly tendered services for which 
they have statutory responsibility (such as 
refuse collection and ground maintenance) 
to commercial providers (Leach & Percy-
Smith, 2001). 
Th e consequences of local fragmentation 
and entrenched central control for local 
government’s capacity and willingness 
to develop DH systems are various. Local 
government activities are oriented towards 
exemplifying good practice (e.g. reducing its 
own estate’s carbon footprint) and enabling 
others to act, rather than direct provision 
of services (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006). Our 
case-study research across diff erent local 
authorities indicates an uncomfortable 
fi t between DH and organisational 
structures, with diff erent departments 
taking the lead on heat networks in 
diff erent authorities (for example, 
housing, regeneration or environmental 
departments). Departmental fragmentation 
can frustrate attempts to develop 
schemes: for example in one case we 
have examined a lack of cooperation 
among neighbouring departments has 
undermined implementation of a pilot 
scheme, particularly its designed use of 
existing revenue and accounting systems to 
manage customer billing.
Th e capacity within local government 
to develop technically and fi nancially 
viable energy systems is limited not only 
by their lack of experience with energy 
(having had the power to operate gas 
and electricity systems removed under 
the nationalisations in the 1940s), but 
also by the orientation of in-house skills 
to managing relationships with external 
service providers. Where local government 
has developed DH systems, this has often 
relied on costly consultancy services, and 
where offi  cers lack technical knowledge 
to adequately specify consultancy 
requirements the quality of work delivered 
is variable: for example, in one case we have 
researched in depth, an initial feasibility 
study indicated the proposed scheme 
would require under £10m investment, 
while a second study doubled the capital 
cost, reduced the payback period by over 
a year and indicated the scheme’s internal 
rate of return would be twice that initially 
estimated. Furthermore, local government 
offi  cers in district energy workshops have 
raised concerns about the impartiality of 
advice (which is cheaper from companies 
able to also construct DH systems) and the 
outsourcing of knowledge development 
(see also King & Shaw, 2010). Th ose local 
authorities which have developed DH 
systems follow diff erent routes (Hawkey et 
al., 2013) but a common theme emerging 
from interviews and workshops with local 
authority offi  cers is that project success 
relies on the persistence of a small number 
of dedicated individuals, often just one 
or two, whose struggles to coordinate 
resources within their organisation are 
neatly captured in the epithets they apply 
to themselves, such as “sheepdog,” “wilful 
individual,” or “lone nutter.” 
Th us while local government potentially 
plays important roles in the development 
of strategic, city-wide heat networks, their 
limited capacity coupled with fragmented 
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internal structure and dispersal of 
service delivery across numerous other 
organisations often limits the scope of 
planned systems. While enthusiastic local 
authority offi  cers participating in district 
energy workshops try to “think big but start 
small” (Lovell et al., 2011) the challenges 
of designing and funding future-proofed 
systems (for example, with oversized 
pipework to ensure capacity for future 
connections) coupled with uncertainty 
in whether additional heat load will be 
available in future mean implementation 
of a strategic approach is rare. DECC has 
recently created a Heat Networks Delivery 
Unit, one function of which is to help local 
authorities navigate the development of 
schemes, particularly supporting them 
in negotiation with the private sector 
for consultancy services (DECC, 2013). 
Whether this process is also able to help 
local authorities broker relationships across 
multiple subscriber organisations will be 
crucial to whether heat networks continue 
to be predominantly small and fragmented, 
or develop as more strategic local energy 
systems.
Central Government Capital Funding for 
Heat Networks
Where DH schemes have developed over 
the past decade, funding programmes 
directed by central government have 
often been instrumental. Th e Community 
Energy Programme (CEP), initiated in 2002 
with a budget of £50m, illustrates aspects 
of how DH is appraised by government, 
and challenges in the development of an 
ongoing development programme. CEP 
was sponsored by the Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs 
(Defra). It had social objectives (reducing 
carbon emissions and fuel poverty), but 
used a cost-benefi t analysis model for 
appraisal of individual schemes rooted 
in the fi nancial transactions schemes 
engaged in (rather than externalised or 
non-transactional objectives). Future 
transactional costs and benefi ts were 
discounted for comparison with current 
costs and benefi ts using a social discount 
rate of 3.5% per year (HM Treasury, 2003) 
which (in theory) weighed equally the 
preferences of people now and in future. 
Projects that satisfi ed the programme’s 
criteria were eligible for up to 40% capital 
funding. 
Th e programme imposed demanding 
timescales on project development, 
meaning only relatively simple, smaller 
schemes were able to complete. As heat 
networks exhibit increasing returns to scale 
(International Energy Agency, 2005) the 
performance of the small networks that 
went ahead under the programme was 
consequently disappointing. In addition to 
this, Defra identifi ed diffi  culties produced 
by the spike in demand for consultancy 
and contractor services created by the 
programme, which exacerbated its poor 
outcomes (relative to its objectives) by 
raising prices for these services and 
lengthening lead times (Hawkey, 2012). 
In the 2006 review of the UK’s Climate 
Change Programme, the CEP was abruptly 
ended, with UK Government citing “other 
programmes that can more cost-eff ectively 
deliver carbon savings” (Defra, 2006: 88). 
Th e decision to end the Community 
Energy Programme echoes Russell’s 
observation both of the narrowing of 
appraisal metrics, and the role of earlier 
disappointing schemes in shaping visions 
and understanding of how DH performs 
in a UK context. In both programmes 
Russell examined and the CEP, contextual 
factors shaping the poor performance of 
those systems were ignored (including, 
in the 2006 case, the terms of the funding 
programme itself, and the broader context 
of energy systems discussed in the following 
section). It also illustrates continuity in the 
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dependence of local authorities engaged 
with DH on central government, and the 
uncertainties generated for the former by 
shifts in the position of the latter.
Since the CEP, more grant funding has 
been made available to local authorities for 
DH: a £25m ‘green stimulus’ in 2009 (Homes 
and Communities Agency, 2011), and 
funding under climate change obligations 
imposed on energy companies (DECC, 
2012a). Tight timescales for grant spending 
are still, however, diffi  cult to reconcile with 
strategic local energy development.
Planning Policy and Building Control 
Powers and guidance issued to local 
government on spatial planning and 
building control provide another example 
of challenging central-local government 
relationships. Planning guidance issued in 
England in 2007 required local authorities 
to develop targets for new development to 
use renewable and decentralised energy, 
with funding available to support creation 
of local evidence bases (Department of 
Communities and Local Government, 
2007). Planning guidance did not, however, 
indicate how support for decentralised 
energy should be balanced against other 
goals set out in the planning system, such 
as provision of aff ordable housing or 
speedy processing of planning applications 
(Williams, 2010). In spite of this drawback, 
some local authorities did use the guidance 
both to create local requirements for 
new developments (such as housing or 
commercial buildings) to adopt DH, and to 
rejuvenate legacy networks on the grounds 
that new planning guidance opened 
opportunities to extend these systems 
(Hawkey, 2013). Following the election of a 
new UK government in 2010, the planning 
system underwent a major overhaul 
through the Localism Act 2011, under 
which regional planning strategies were 
abandoned, central government guidance 
was simplifi ed to remove “top-down” 
policies (such as those set out around 
decentralised energy) and local groups were 
given powers to develop neighbourhood 
plans within the planning system. Offi  cers 
from local authorities which had aligned 
their DH planning approach around 
planning guidance and support from 
regional bodies report these reforms 
undermined their capacity to develop 
robust local policy with some describing 
the new arrangements as a ‘shipwreck’ in 
workshop discussions (Hawkey, 2013).
Building standards have passed through 
a parallel evolution, with a 2006 policy 
to ensure all new homes built after 2016 
were net zero carbon. Th e policy allowed 
for onsite emissions to be off set by savings 
elsewhere, with developers investing 
in ‘allowable solutions’ including DH 
networks. However, the scale of investment 
the mechanism was expected to produce 
was signifi cantly reduced in 2011 when 
central government restricted the defi nition 
of ‘zero carbon’ to cover only emissions 
associated with heating and lighting (Zero 
Carbon Hub, 2011), and further uncertainty 
surrounds the mechanism by which funds 
generated by the policy will be distributed. 
Under these changeable conditions, 
local government offi  cers participating in 
a DH workshop on central government 
policy (see Hawkey, 2013) raised the 
question of whether local government 
has a ‘mandate’ to develop heat networks, 
and what central government’s view is 
as to who is the ‘rightful owner of district 
energy’ (e.g. local authorities or commercial 
developers). Th us in spite of a rhetoric of 
releasing local government from central 
control, in relation to district heating this 
has not led to perceptions of local authority 
empowerment among offi  cers, due both 
to authorities’ ongoing dependency on 
inconstant central government policy, and 
a tendency among local authorities to look 
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to central government to sanction their DH 
activities.
Energy Policy and the 
Co-production of Heat and Power
Th e nationalised electricity supply 
industry, structured as a central generating 
organisation providing bulk supply to 
regional distribution boards, played a 
crucial role in Russell’s account of the 
marginalisation of CHP. Privatisation and 
liberalisation of the sector has resulted in 
signifi cant restructuring of the industry, 
now based around six companies 
integrating generation and retail activities, 
supplying 99% of domestic customers 
(Ofgem, 2008). While the principle of 
de-integration was not sustained with 
respect to electricity generation and 
retail (Th omas, 2006), distribution and 
transmission networks are separated 
as regulated monopolies. While two of 
the six integrated companies do operate 
distribution networks, they are required to 
keep these separate from generation and 
retail activities behind “Chinese Walls”. 
Activities of the companies are overseen 
by an independent regulator, Ofgem, and 
European directives play an increasing role 
in governance of the sector. Th us the range 
of actors involved in the sector (either as 
direct participants or in governance) has 
increased, and monopoly power has been 
mitigated by a mixture of competition and 
independent regulation. To what extent has 
this opened opportunities for CHP and DH?
Participation in Energy Markets
During both CHP/DH programmes, the 
nationalised electricity supply industry 
perceived small CHP systems embedded 
in distribution networks as contrary to its 
interests in centralised generation, and 
off ered poor terms for connection to the 
network and low tariff s (Russell, 1993). 
Th e current regulatory split between 
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) 
and generators in principle alleviates this 
confl ict. However, while DNOs formally 
do not have an interest in generation, the 
UK regulatory model, a form of price-
cap regulation, still creates misalignment 
between DNO interests and distributed 
generation. Th e intended impact of price 
cap regulation was to drive cost reduction 
(Bolton & Foxon, 2011). Th e nationalised 
industry had left a legacy of networks with 
signifi cant capacity margins built in, and 
DNOs have faced little need to invest in 
network innovation. Consequently, they 
have profi tably operated by cutting R&D 
spending in network development, and 
have done little to reconfi gure networks 
to better accommodate decentralised 
generation (for example, through active 
power management), instead treating 
proposals to connect generation in 
a piecemeal fashion, leading to high 
connection charges (Bolton & Foxon, 
2011). In its 2005 Price Control Review, the 
regulator introduced fi nancial incentives 
for DNOs to invest in R&D and to trial 
network innovations to connect distributed 
generation. While R&D spending did 
increase, only three network innovation 
projects were undertaken (Bolton & Foxon, 
2011). Distributed generators continue 
to complain that DNOs impose opaque 
conditions and high charges for connection 
(Ofgem, 2011a).
Where CHP operators have connected 
to the public system, they have found 
participation in the UK’s wholesale market 
challenging. Credit and administrative 
requirements are high, and penalties for 
failing to generate the quantity of electricity 
forecast can be relatively more severe for 
CHP operators than for large companies 
able to respond to imbalances within their 
own portfolios (Toke & Fragaki, 2008). 
Long term planning for CHP developers 
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is made challenging by poor visibility 
of future electricity prices as wholesale 
market liquidity is low, because wholesale 
electricity transactions are dominated by 
self-supply within vertically integrated 
supplier/generators (Ofgem, 2011b).
Small CHP generators therefore usually 
avoid the wholesale market. Some sell to 
a consolidator, an energy supplier which 
eff ectively treats a generator’s output as 
negative demand but at tariff s considerably 
lower than wholesale prices (Toke & 
Fragaki, 2008). Sale over a ‘private wire’ 
network (i.e. a distributed generator’s own 
network outside the public distribution 
system) can generate income comparable 
with retail electricity prices, and exemptions 
from the electricity generation licensing 
regime limit costs, albeit while also 
limiting permissible scale (London Energy 
Partnership, 2007). Private wire networks 
also give small generators the advantage 
of a relatively stable market as users face a 
barrier to switching suppliers in the form of 
the cost of a new connection to the public 
system. However, in 2008 the European 
Court of Justice1 found against this form 
of supply monopoly, ruling that private 
wire networks must grant access to third 
party suppliers to allow subscribers access 
to competitive markets, undermining the 
long-term business models for CHP/DH 
systems with private wire. For example, 
an interviewee from a municipally owned 
energy services company (ESCo) indicated 
fears that larger companies would off er ‘silly 
prices’ to poach the lucrative customers 
connected to the ESCo’s private wire (offi  ce 
developments, supermarkets, shopping 
centres, etc.). Th ese market conditions for 
CHP electricity, therefore, favour more 
restricted situations where long term 
agreements for power supply to large users 
can be brokered. Our research on specifi c 
cases in the UK indicates such agreements 
tend to rely on organisational relationships, 
for example campus-based CHP/DH 
systems where heat and power are used by 
a single organisation such as a university, or 
municipally-led schemes where electricity 
can be used by municipal facilities such as 
leisure centres and schools (e.g. Webb & 
Hawkey, 2014).
Several recent regulatory changes 
and incentive mechanisms have been 
introduced or are in development to tackle 
both network access and access to power 
markets: a new regulatory regime for DNOs 
(Ofgem, 2010); a mechanism for small 
generators to use the resources of licensed 
suppliers who would voluntarily give 
them access to the retail market, ‘License 
Light’ (Ofgem, 2009); proposals to increase 
wholesale market liquidity (Ofgem, 2012); 
and proposals to subsidise gas CHP (DECC, 
2013). What the outcome of these combined 
changes will be is diffi  cult to predict, and 
indeed this diffi  culty of knowing how 
what the outcome of interventions and 
regulatory changes will be is, as Mitchell 
(2008) argues, a characteristic of the 
RSP. Th at outcomes may not cohere with 
intentions is demonstrated by the failure 
of the 2005 attempt to incentivise DNOs to 
accommodate more distributed generation. 
Preferences of the Incumbent Energy 
Companies
Several of the six dominant energy 
companies in the UK have small business 
units focused on CHP and DH. Th ese 
units undertake a variety of development, 
construction and operational roles 
in DH systems, some appearing to 
invest defensively, others seeking more 
constructive local engagement. However, 
the overarching fi nancial models and 
investment preferences of the incumbents 
are diffi  cult to reconcile with the locally 
specifi c, incremental and social-capital 
oriented characteristics of much DH 
development (Hawkey et al., 2013). Th e 
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reorientation of the industry in the wake 
of liberalisation, away from national 
systems of energy production, towards 
international ownership and associated 
fl ows of capital and technologies result 
in preferences for delocalised, scalable, 
replicable and predictable investment 
opportunities (Winskel, 2002). Th e 
mismatch is particularly stark in terms of 
investment scale. DH initiatives, limited by 
the diffi  culties in coordinating subscribers, 
rarely exceed around ten million pounds 
of investment. While there has been some 
participation among the incumbents in a 
handful of projects at this scale, they are 
small in comparison with other energy 
investments. For example, an offi  cer 
from one of the Big Six energy companies 
indicated at practitioner and research 
workshops that his company would see half 
a billion pounds as a minimum investment 
in a scheme.
Analysis of policy documents since 
2003 suggests the incumbent companies 
are resistant to interventions designed to 
encourage co-generation of heat and power 
from their large thermal power stations. In 
2003, UK government committed to alter 
the procedures for power station consents, 
requiring generators to demonstrate they 
had considered options for heat off -take 
(DTI, 2003). However, as the distance heat 
can be transmitted via pipes is limited (by 
fi nancial, rather than technical constraints, 
Roberts, 2008), these considerations would 
only conclude in favour of cogeneration 
if plant were located close to sites of 
considerable heat demand. Th e change 
to the consent procedures did not require 
consideration of alternative locations 
for their plant when appraising CHP 
opportunities, and consequently were 
ineff ective as developers selected sites too 
far from demand centres for the option to 
be viable (DECC, 2009: 96). Early drafts of 
the 2012 EU Energy Effi  ciency Directive 
proposed stronger regulation that new 
and refurbished thermal generation plant 
above 20MW be required to operate in 
CHP mode. In research interviews and 
discussions, commercial and policy offi  cers 
indicate that UK industry and government 
actively resisted this proposal which was 
eventually watered down to a requirement 
to conduct a cost/benefi t analysis of CHP 
operation, reducing the estimated energy 
savings impact of the measure by 70% from 
25 Mtoe to 8 Mtoe (Services of the European 
Commission, 2012).
Infl uences on UK Government Energy 
Policy
Following the programme to privatise and 
liberalise the energy sector in the 1990s, 
UK government did not produce a formal 
energy policy until 2003. Th e re-emergence 
of energy policy, driven by energy security 
and climate change concerns, was 
formulated in a White Paper. CHP was set 
alongside renewables as being central to a 
vision of future low carbon generation (DTI, 
2003), and both forms of generation were 
exempted from the new Climate Change 
Levy. DH was also directly supported under 
the UK’s Community Energy Programme 
described above.
In the CHP/DH programmes of the 
1940/50s and 1970/80s, CHP struggled to 
fi nd a place in an electricity system not 
designed for it (Russell, 1993). Parallel 
diffi  culties were acknowledged in the 
2003 White Paper: “nationwide and local 
electricity grids, metering systems and 
regulatory arrangements […] were created 
for a world of large-scale, centralised power 
stations.” It argued that these would all 
need to be restructured to accommodate 
renewable and decentralised energy (DTI, 
2003: para.1.40). Th e paper identifi ed 
several barriers to greater deployment 
of CHP and DH, namely terms of access 
to distribution networks, diffi  culties 
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participating in wholesale markets, and the 
failure of the planning system to direct new 
power stations to be located suffi  ciently 
close to areas of high heat demand that 
large scale heat off -take would be possible. 
As discussed above, a decade later 
these issues still challenge widespread 
development of DH and CHP. While 
the 2003 White Paper envisaged an 
energy system re-oriented to distributed 
generation, its successor in 2007 was 
more ambivalent, seeing decentralised 
generation as “a complement rather than an 
alternative to centralised generation” (DTI, 
2007: para.3.8). By the 2009 Energy White 
Paper, mention of decentralised generation 
and its challenges was completely dropped 
(DECC, 2009). When decentralised energy 
has appeared in recent policy documents, 
its role has been presented as marginal: 
“the Government does not believe that 
decentralised and community energy 
systems are likely to lead to signifi cant 
replacement of larger-scale infrastructure” 
(DECC, 2011b: para.3.3.29). 
A number of factors may be adduced 
to explain this return to decentralised 
energy being considered as adjunct rather 
than alternative to the centralised system, 
including the forms of analysis used in 
policy development, the infl uence of 
incumbent interests on policy visions, 
and divisions within government between 
producer and consumer oriented policy 
making. 
Russell (1993) argued that appraisal 
methods disguised organisational interests 
in apparently technical debates, pointing 
particularly to the way CHP and DH were 
appraised by the nationalised electricity 
industry. Computational models informing 
policy are predominantly commissioned 
by government from either commercial 
consultancies or academic institutions, 
suggesting the interests of electricity 
generators do not have the same direct 
infl uence over selection of appraisal 
methods. However, UK policy has 
reoriented towards visions of centralised 
energy systems, and Rogers-Hayden et 
al. (2011) argue that industry interests 
have played a crucial role in shaping 
those visions. Th ey describe how energy 
security and climate change discourses 
were reshaped between 2003 and 2005 by 
an intensive lobbying campaign by nuclear 
power interests. Climate change shifted 
from being a “symptom of unsustainability” 
to an “environmental issue”, and energy 
security shifted from a “lack of diversity” 
to a “gas-gap”. Both changes marginalising 
arguments in favour of decentralised energy 
and supporting visions of electrifi cation 
(of heat and transport) which emerged as 
core solutions to energy problems (e.g. UK 
Committee on Climate Change, 2008). 
Mitchell (2008) argues that the UK 
government was receptive to this reframing 
in part because a centralised approach is 
more familiar and hence more attractive: 
appearing to require less intervention in 
the daily lives of millions of UK citizens; 
implying continuity in the retail market and 
supplier business models; and requiring 
construction of a small number of large 
plants rather than a large number of smaller 
interventions. Th is orientation to producer 
interests was, before 2008, refl ected in the 
departmental structure of UK government, 
with the Department for Trade and Industry 
assuming responsibility for production 
side policy, and the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Aff airs 
responsible for climate change and energy 
consumption policies areas such as fuel 
poverty. Th e Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), created in 2008, 
was designed to overcome these divisions, 
but after fi ve years the internal structure 
of DECC maintains a high level division 
between production and consumption 
(DECC, 2012b), offi  cers acknowledge in 
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research interviews that this structural 
division is refl ected in the work of the 
department, and outsiders complain that 
these policy silos lead to outcomes which 
frustrate development of CHP and DH 
(Meeks, 2013). 
Conclusions
In a striking formulation, Russell (1993: 50) 
concluded that “some basic features of our 
social and economic organisation mean 
it is intrinsically incapable of promoting 
effi  cient use of resources.” Th e evidence 
reviewed above indicates that, while there 
have been many changes to the social 
and economic organisation of the UK, 
particularly attempts to disperse decision 
making away from central government in 
both energy and local government, key 
features underpinning the frustration of 
previous attempts to develop widespread 
CHP/DH programmes remain and 
challenge the prospects for contemporary 
development. In the electricity sector, 
while the UK model of liberalisation and 
privatisation has ended the monopoly 
of the nationalised industry, the new 
regulatory structures and organisational 
interests are aligned around the centralised 
system of generation which they inherited. 
Th is alignment contributes to the marginal 
economics of CHP through connection 
terms and tariff s available to CHP operators. 
In local government, while authorities 
have greater formal freedom to develop 
DH schemes, limits to their capacity and 
ongoing dependence on changeable central 
government policy mean projects are 
developed in unusual circumstances and 
are often small, fragmented systems rather 
than the comprehensive strategic networks 
able to achieve economies of scale and 
scope.
In addition to these broad systemic 
continuities, some of the detailed reasons 
for the marginalisation of CHP and DH 
identifi ed by Russell have contemporary 
parallels. While a range of social goals are 
often acknowledged in policy documents, 
appraisal of support programmes and 
future scenarios (through modelling) adopt 
narrow fi nancial criteria. Schemes which do 
manage to fi nd a place in the interstices of 
unfavourable energy and local governance 
conditions perform poorly against such 
criteria, contributing to the marginalisation 
of DH and CHP from visions of future 
energy systems which can worsen the 
already unfavourable conditions (as, for 
example, happened with the decision to 
withdraw funding under the CEP). 
While the retreat of central government 
from active planning was a component of 
the failure of both national programmes 
Russell studied, the inappropriateness 
of government planning (as opposed 
to competitive market allocation) is 
virtually axiomatic in contemporary policy 
development under the RSP, including in 
relation to heat infrastructure (e.g. DECC, 
2011c: para.25; DECC, 2013: para.3.55). 
As Mitchell (2008) argues, government 
determination to maintain technology 
neutrality and market effi  ciency leads 
to ineff ective policies, whose impacts 
are diffi  cult to predict, and which can 
achieve change only slowly. While central 
government recognised systematic barriers 
to deployment of decentralised energy a 
decade ago (DTI, 2003), policy responses 
have not managed to overcome these 
issues, suggesting Russell and Williams’ 
(2002a: 145) concerns that technology 
policies could “resign [themselves] to minor 
tinkering with agendas and directions of 
development set by powerful interests” 
were well founded.
Th e division in the energy sector 
between producer interests and 
consumer interests (as meditated by local 
government) is still present in the UK, both 
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in the autonomy of the companies which 
dominate the production and supply of 
energy from local government, and in 
the enduring split between production 
and consumption issues in energy policy. 
However, there are some countervailing 
pressures in the UK which merit further 
attention for understanding the prospects 
for district energy. Devolved government 
(in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
London) created at the end of the 1990s has 
responsibility for local government, and 
restricted competence in governance of 
the centralised energy system. Under these 
conditions, support for local government 
in developing DH networks is one way 
devolved government can intervene in 
energy issues confronting its domain, 
and London in particular has pursued 
relatively clear decentralised energy 
policies (Greater London Authority, 2008, 
2009; Williams, 2010). Tensions between 
the form of market liberalisation in the 
UK and the objectives of energy security, 
aff ordability and climate change mitigation 
are increasingly recognised in UK energy 
policy and underpin current eff orts to 
reform the electricity market (DECC, 
2011a). Th e UK opposition Labour Party 
announced in 2013 its intention, should it 
form the next government, to freeze energy 
prices for twenty months during which it 
would ‘reset’ the energy market, though 
details remain vague (Milliband, 2013). Th e 
UK may therefore be entering a new phase 
of upheaval in the energy sector, though it 
remains to be seen whether this creates 
conditions which mitigate or resolve the 
tensions between producer and consumer 
interests which Russell argued lay behind 
much of the marginalisation of CHP and 
DH. 
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